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I believe it is possible to assert that the foundations of modern citizenship consist in 
membership and rights. A similar conclusion is reached in Thomas H. Marshall’s work 
as well as in Bryan S. Turner’s definition. The first author emphasises the importance of 
status and the latter the role of practices. Hence, citizenship is an individual and egalitarian 
status belonging to all members of the same community, and takes shape in a set of practices 
identifying the action and subjectivity of each member. Sharing the experience of citizenship 
is therefore a fundamental social experience, both in an ethnic, and republican sense. 
It is then possible to assert that its nature of individual and egalitarian status prevails 
over its nature of juridical relationship linking a physical person and a State. I mean that 
citizenship is not simply the sum of rights and duties protected within a given community, 
but rather the daily usage of these rights and duties. There the sociological take on citi-
zenship steps in, as the citizenship status precedes the specific palette of individual rights 
and duties, producing practical consequences by itself. Evidently, the discussion around the 
concept of citizenship has its keystone in the interpretation that frames it. So, what is your 
definition of citizenship?
My shortest definition is that citizenship means membership in a self-go-
verning political community. This is the core of the concept that contains all 




she volunteers to serve on committees. When we say this, we do not mean 
that professors  are actually  citizens of universities, but  that  there are  some 
analogies between universities and political communities, such as institutional 
self-administration and the idea that faculty members have equal status. But 
it is always citizenship in the political community that provides the model on 
which such analogies draw. 
Second,  the  term  ‘membership’  is  deliberately  vague.  It  can  apply  to  a 
legal status, such as nationality in the international state system, or to the en-
joyment of certain rights that distinguish members from non-members even 
where there is no corresponding legal status. A good illustration is the right 
to vote in local elections that is granted to all foreign residents (and not only 
to EU citizens) in 12 EU member states. In my view, this right turns foreign 





way that requires direct democratic participation of all citizens in government 
(as Aristotle and Rousseau thought) or in a minimalist way that accepts poli-
tical freedoms and representative government as sufficient. I lean towards the 
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latter view. The point of insisting on self-government is to link citizenship to 
democracy and to draw the line with autocratic regimes that produce subjects 
but are not accountable to citizens. 
Fourth, much of the sociological literature on citizenship regards it prima-
rily as a practice rather than as membership in the sense of a status, a bundle 
of rights, or an identity. The practice dimension of citizenship is indeed an 
important aspect of citizenship. People enact their citizenship, as Engin Isin 
has  called  it, when  they become politically  active. And  sustainable  self-go-
vernment also needs civic virtues of citizens, such as the willingness to contest 
arbitrary exercises of power. However,  in my view, practices and virtues of 




The architecture of the EU involves a plurality of citizenship levels, does it mark a sort 
of stratification of citizenships?
EU citizenship as a legal status links only the national level with the su-
pranational  one:  EU  citizenship  is  derived  from member  state  nationality. 
However, the political rights of EU citizenship include also the right to vote in 





and local citizens. Certain social hierarchies – or inequalities of citizenship 
– emerge not between European, national,  and  local  citizens, but between 
stable  citizens,  for whom European  citizenship  seems hardly  relevant, mo-
bile EU citizens who enjoy free movement and extensive non-discrimination 
rights, and third country nationals who are less protected and whose access to 
citizenship depends on the nationality laws of the member states. 
How important is the residence factor in everyday citizenship?
Most rights that were historically reserved for citizens depend today on 
residence rather than nationality. However, there are two important excep-
tions: the right to vote at national level and the right of territorial residence 
and admission. Authors who claim that citizenship will become completely 
disconnected from nationality and connected to residence instead tend to 
ignore that access to residence itself remains conditional upon nationality. 






Residence is the most important condition for access to citizenship throu-
gh naturalisation, but it is never sufficient and sometimes not even necessary. 
Long term residents are never naturalised automatically; they must apply to 




supranational  levels,  local citizenship can be completely disconnected  from 
nationality.  I have already mentioned above that 12 EU member states grant 
local voting rights to all residents rather than only to EU citizens. Residence-
based political rights of local citizenship may still be exceptional, but internal 
freedom of movement is a human right for all those who lawfully reside in a 
national territory. Municipalities have therefore open borders and cannot im-
pose naturalisation requirements. They have to treat all their local residents 
de facto as their citizens. Local democracy should therefore include all resi-
dents not only as de facto but also de jure citizens who can fully participate in 
democratic politics at the local level.
Multilevel citizenship in the EU could thus rely on a coherent combination 









The European citizens are the citizens of the 28 EU member states. This means that 
there are many criteria and many ways to acquire the status of European citizen. Could you 
explain this configuration of citizenship/citizenships?
The European constellation is indeed somewhat paradoxical. The 28 na-
tionality  laws of  the member states regulate access to a common European 
citizenship  in  very  different ways.  But  those who  have  acquired  the  status 
enjoy free movement rights and can settle and work also in those states that 
wanted to keep them out through high hurdles for naturalisation. In the long 
run, this is not sustainable. We will either get pressures from member states to 
reintroduce restrictions of free movement – and this seems to be the current 
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trend – or some common standards for access to EU citizenship will have to 
be defined. There are also some indications for this second trend. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union, in its judgment in the Rottmann case, deci-
ded that member states have to apply a principle of proportionality and must 
take EU law into account when depriving an EU citizen of his nationality 
would result in a loss of EU citizenship. In 2014 the European Parliament and 
Commission intervened against a Maltese  law that offered EU passports to 
investors without a residence requirement in the island state. Their argument 
was that no member state can be allowed to turn EU citizenship into a mar-
ketable commodity without the consent of all the other member states.




their sovereignty. There are certain historical analogies for this constellation 
in 18th and 19th century confederations, such as Germany before unification 
or the US before consolidation of federal citizenship through the 14th consti-
tutional amendment that was adopted after the Civil War. The most similar 
current case is Switzerland, where federal citizenship is still formally derived 
from cantonal citizenship rather than the other way round, as is the case in all 
other federal states. Yet even in Switzerland, a federal law determines who is 
a Swiss by birth and regulates the loss of citizenship as well as the minimum 





In the future, can we imagine becoming European citizens without passing through the 
prerequisite of national citizenship? I am thinking especially of stateless persons, refugees, 
and migrants who yearn for European citizenship…
We cannot  exclude  the historic possibility  that  the European Union  (or 
a smaller ‘core Europe’) will become a federal state. Just as the EU emerged 
from the ashes of World War II, such a transformation is not likely to occur 
gradually through Treaty reforms, but could be the result of a catastrophic 
shock, such as a complete collapse of the common currency or a dramatic 
escalation of Russian aggression affecting Eastern European EU states. Short 
of such scenarios, the EU is going to stay what it is, a union of member states 
that have agreed to pool sovereign powers without creating a new indepen-
dent layer of sovereignty at the European level. Citizenship in such a political 
and economic union of states must remain linked to and derivative of mem-
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ber state citizenship. The alternative of an EU citizenship based on residence 




des, by contrast,  a  strong argument  for  common European  standards with 
regard to access to EU citizenship through the nationality laws of the mem-
ber states. Stateless persons and refugees are the most obvious case. All EU 
member states are already bound under international conventions to prevent 
statelessness and to facilitate the access of refugees to their citizenship. The 
European Union could do more to promote inclusion of those who have lost 
the protection of their citizenship of origin. But the case can also be made that 
naturalisation  after  five  years  of  residence  and without  onerous  additional 
conditions, such as renunciation of a  foreign nationality, should become an 




that provide  extraterritorial  access  to EU citizenship  for  third  country na-
tionals who can prove the right ancestry. Ethnic origin is not a fair criterion 
for admission of  immigrants except where individuals suffer persecution on 
grounds of their ethnic identity. Many of those who get EU passports on these 
grounds use them to enter other states than the one that grants them citi-
zenship. Restricting  these practices of  ethnic  inclusion would  thus  reflect a 
common interest of all member states, just as much as restricting the sale of 
EU passports by Malta or Cyprus.
Are the economic and humanitarian crisis encouraging a retreat in the national level? 
From Fortress Europe to many national fortresses…
There is indeed a real danger that some member states (imitating the UK’s 
strategy in preparation of the Brexit referendum) will try to get broader po-
wers to restrict internal freedom of movement for EU citizens and that Schen-




tes in response to the current humanitarian refugee crisis, we just need to 
imagine how this crisis would play out in the absence of Fortress Europe. The 
death toll in the Mediterranean would be probably much higher. 
Internal freedom of movement in the EU does require a harmonization of 
border controls and of conditions for admission of refugees. But such harmo-
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nization does not have to end up in the current negative competition between 
states, which results exactly from the gaps in Europeanization of immigration 
and refugee policy. Europe is currently faced with a humanitarian crisis si-
milar in scale to that triggered by the Nazi regime’s persecution and military 
aggression. Europe’s response so far has been shamefully inadequate.  A full 
retreat into national fortresses would mean replicating the situation of the 
1940s when one state after the other turned away ships with Jewish refugees 
pointing to others that should take them in. The current crisis is a moral test 
for the strength of European integration. If member states continue to block 
European solutions for the admission and distribution of refugees, more refu-
gees will die and European integration itself will have suffered a severe blow.
